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HLD-009  (October 29, 2010)  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-2948 
___________ 
 
DAPHNE MARIE RODENBAUGH,  
                                                     Appellant 
v. 
 
GULF INSURANCE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-CV-00688) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon 
Magistrate Judge:  Martin C. Carlson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 29, 2010 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS,  Circuit Judges 
   
  (Opinion filed: February 17, 2011)                                                       
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Daphne Rodenbaugh, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed her 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In March 2010, Rodenbaugh filed a complaint, naming Gulf Insurance as 
2 
 
the defendant, and also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”).  The 
complaint sought to have the District Court reverse certain state court orders in her 
workers’ compensation matter and remand to the state court, or reverse the orders, 
apparently so the insurance company would continue to pay her claims. 
 The Magistrate Judge assigned to the case granted Rodenbaugh’s motion to 
proceed ifp, but informed her that her complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The Magistrate Judge informed 
Rodenbaugh of federal pleading requirements, as clarified in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  The Magistrate 
Judge also noted that her complaint, as filed, was subject to dismissal pursuant to the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
1
  Rodenbaugh was given an opportunity to file an amended 
complaint, which was to:  (1) be complete in all respects; (2) address the issues raised by 
the Magistrate Judge’s order; and (3) be a new pleading which stood by itself as an 
adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed. 
 Rodenbaugh filed an amended complaint within the time allowed.  The 
amended complaint consisted of one page, with three numbered paragraphs.  Paragraph 
one stated that she “was denied her civil rights to have here medical to be paid in the 
amount of aprox $2,000.00 as they were paying for years then stoped.”  The second 
paragraph stated, “Daphne Plaintiff amends this and cannot get relief in state court 
defendant is in another state.”  The third paragraph sought money damages.   
                                        
1
 The Supreme Court laid out the principles of the doctrine in Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). 
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 Our review of the order dismissing the complaint is plenary.  Taliaferro v. 
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court properly 
determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Rodenbaugh’s complaint, pursuant to the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to the extent she sought outright reversal of state court 
decisions.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) 
(Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives district courts of jurisdiction over “cases brought by 
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 
rejection of those judgments”). 
 To the extent Rodenbaugh sought other relief, the District Court properly 
dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  
Rodenbaugh’s amended complaint is bereft of any “factual matter, accepted as true,” that 
would be sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  The amended complaint says that 
her civil rights were violated, but it does not, for example, set forth any facts that would 
indicate that the defendant is a state actor, as would be required to pursue a federal civil 
rights claim.  42 U.S.C. § 1983; Revell v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).   A free-standing legal conclusion that one’s civil rights 
have been violated does not meet federal pleading standards.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 149-50. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
